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Republicanism in Georgia: A Contemporary Perspective
RoBERTK. WHELANand MICHAELW. McK.mNEY
Georgia Institute of Technology
Like the rules for Alice's croquet game with the Queen of Hearts,
the electoral patterns of the Republican party in Georgia defy systematic description. We thus approach a nebulous topic which at any
given time displays apparently inconsistent trends. Republican electoral
fortunes in Georgia have waxed and waned with little regularity over
the last decade, from overwhelming victories at the presidential level
to stunning defeats in state contests. This paper seeks to make some
conceptual sense of these patterns by examining previous typologies of
Republican voters and suggesting which elements of these retain the
greatest validity. It is hoped that our efforts will place Georgia's Republicanism in regional perspective and offer some guideposts for further
research into the future of the two-party system in the American South.
Arguments concerning the strength and durability of the American
two party system tend to be dichotomized into two principal groups. One
set of observers believes in the basic viability of the competitive two
party system. Frank Sorauf, for example, notes that "while the future
of the minor parties seems uncertain, one can with confidence point to
a . . . general trend in the American party system: the increasing
competitiveness of the major parties." 1 In contrast, other political analysts see a less optimistic future for the extant party system, insisting
that it requires basic restructuring and revitalization. James McGregor
Burns' Deadlock of Demo cracy 2 and David Broder's The Party's Over 3
are examples of the less sanguine view of the future of the two party
system. This dichotomous perception of the nature of the American
party system is undoubtedly related to the historical role of party
systems, as Lipset and Rokkan have noted. "'Party' has throughout the
history of Western government stood for division, conflict, opposition
within a body politic." At the same time, the authors note, political
4,

1
Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America, second edition ( Boston: Little,
Brown, 1972), pp. 51-52.
2
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
8 New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
4
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems,
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in their Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 3.
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parties have also "served as essential agencies of mobilization and as
such have helped to integrate local communities." 5
While some critiques of the American party system are based upon
thoughtful analysis of several years of party electoral conflict, it often
seems that serious questioning of the viability of the two party system
follows closely on the heels of an electoral disaster for one of the parties.
The Republican party was prematurely interred by some commentators
after the Goldwater defeat in the 1964 presidential election, while the
"Emerging Republican Majority" touted after McGovern's defeat by
Nixon in 1972, was submerged in the 1974 off-year elections. 6 After the
latter election, the long-term viability of the Republican party has again
come into question.
The American South constitutes an area in which Republican losses
were particularly acute . Republican hopes for a viable "Southern
Strategy" had been spurred on by Republican successes in the "rim
South," as well as encouraging developments in such southern states as
Georgia, where Republican candidates for the governor's seat had performed credibly, although not actually attaining success. In 1974, however, Republicans lost two United States Senate seats in the South to
Democrats, while seeing ten incumbent House members suffer defeat
as well ( two each from Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina; one
each from Georgia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas).
The state of Georgia, which constitutes the focus of this paper,
evidenced considerable decline in Republican fortunes in 1974. Howard
"Bo" Callaway won a plurality of 46.5% of the votes in the general
election in 1966, and Hal Suit had garnered 40.1% of that vote in 1970.
In 1974, however, Ronnie Thompson could obtain the support of only
30.9% of the statewide electorate . Before the 1974 elections the Republican party in Georgia had one incumbent candidate for the United
States House of Representatives and was given some chance of gaining one or two more House seats ( Quincy Collins versus Larry McDonald in the 7th district and Newt Gingrich against John Flynt in the
6th district). Incumbent Republican Ben Blackbum lost his seat to
Elliott Levitas and the other serious Republican challengers were also
defeated. Indeed, Republicans did not win a single statewide office. In
many cases token opposition, or none at all emerged: Democratic incumbents in the second and eighth districts ran unopposed. Furthermore, the numbers of Republicans in the Georgia State House of Representatives dropped from 29 to 24.
Ibid, p. 4.
See Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle,
N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969).
5
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An analysis of the nature and scope of the Repubucan defeat in
Georgia, while hardly representative of the nation or the region, may
provide some insights into the future of Republicanism in the region.
The Republican defeat nation-wide has been attributed in whole or in
part to such phenomena as the declining economic situation in the
nation and the taint of the Watergate affair upon the national Republican party. To the extent that such forces affected Republicans in
Georgia, this analysis may suggest some relationships which will have
relevance for elections in other parts of the nation or the region.
That national-level events have had some impact upon the electoral
process in Georgia is likely, but difficult to document with any degree
of certainty. Some observers in Georgia feel that the myriad events
which have made up the Watergate affair have led to a type of selffulfilling prophecy of political pathology among Republicans. 7 Attractive
Republicans seem to have surmised that 1974 would not be a banner
year for Republican electoral fortunes . In tum, less attractive candidates were nominated and summarily defeated. At an early stage in the
Republican gubernatorial primary campaigns in Georgia in 1974, a
newspaper reported that "GOPs Find No Heavyweights" in the headline
of a page-one story. The article begins: "Watergate can hardly have a
more devastating effect on the Georgia Republican party in the November election that it has already had on the GOP's chances of having a
first-rate candidate for governor." 8
Such impressionistic discourses are interesting in themselves, but a
more carefully structured analysis of the con-elates of the Republican
vote in Georgia is needed, in particular in relation to earlier electoral
contests in which the GOP had attained more success. The question
might be asked in Georgia whether the decline in the Republican percentage of the statewide vote was due primarily to national level events
or to the quality of the candidates presented . Was the GOP vote qualitatively different from earlier balloting, or was the support GOP candidates received simply lower in magnitude while its distribution remained
similar to earlier patterns? Were "fringe" Republicans disaffected, or
were more ardent supporters lost? The answers to such questions may
allow some estimates to be made concerning the viability of the twoparty system in Georgia. That is, if it can be demonstrated that a
substantial "hard core" of Republican voters exists upon which later
electoral efforts may be based, that party may have a brighter future
than suggested by the recent election. If the Republicans, on the other
7
See, For Example, Linton Broome, "Republicans Their Own Worst Enemy?"
The Dekalb News, January 15, 1975, p. 1.
8
Howell Raines , The Atlanta Constitution, June 19, 1974, pp lA, 15A.
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hand, have lost some constituencies which had hitherto remained loyal,
the 1974 elections may have marked the demise of a fledgling competitive party system. Of course, several different factors may have
combined to produce Republican electoral defeat in Georgia: Watergate
and other national events, local party factionalism, or the primary election successes of candidates unattractive to a larger electorate. This
paper cannot delve into the individual contributions made by such
factors, but instead will concentrate its effort upon determining to what
degree the 1974 gubernatorial election in Georgia deviated from past
elections.
The basic focus of this paper is to examine the nature of the
Republican gubernatorial vote in 1974 with two previous races for the
governor's chair in 1966 and 1970. In recent times Republicans fust
began mounting effective challenges in gubernatorial elections in 1966.9
The gubernatorial races in 1966, 1970, and 1974 offer a relatively pure
indicator of Republican strength in the state. Since such elections are
consistently held during nonpresidential election years, the contamination from "presidential Republicanism" is minimized. 10 The percentage
of the vote gathered by Republican candidates in these three elections
at the county level will thus constitute the dependent variables for
this study.
The independent variables, also aggregated at the county level,
include county population size ( to be referred to as population) , the
percentage of the population engaged in white collar and manufacturing
occupations ( white collar and manufacturing), median family income
(income), mean school years completed by the adult population over
25 years of age (education), percentage of the population considered
rural (rural), percentage of population growth between 1960 and 1970
(growth), percentage of nonwhite residents (race), and population per
square mile (density) .11Included also are the 1973 county millage tax
rates, which give a rough measure of the extractive capability and inclination of a county. 12 This variable relates indirectly, at least, to the
level of services which county residents might expect and are required
9 Republicans had not nominated a gubernatorial candidate in Georgia prior to
1962 since Reconstruction. Their nominee in 1962 died prior to the election and no
successor was named.
10 V. 0. Key, Jr. discusses the concept of "presidential" Republicanism in his
Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp.
277-297.
11 These variables were obtained from the 1970 Census of Population for the
state of Georgia, published by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
12 Source: 1973 Statistical Report, Georgia Departmen t of Revenue.
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to finance. In addition, a "dummy" variable, labelled "SMSA" was constructed as a measure of the proximity of a county to an urban area.
Counties within an SMSA in 1970 were coded highest, and in decreasing
order, counties were grouped according to whether they had shown
a clearly urbanizing trend, contained cities between 25,000 and 50,000
in population, cities between 15,000 and 25,000 population, and finally,
those not containing a place of over 15,000 population. 13 These data,
derived from census sources, are demographic-descriptive and have been
used in other aggregate studies seeking to explain electoral choice.14
The SMSA variable will be used as a rough indicator of the effects of
urban influence where the rural variable may not be an accurate indicator because of the lag in the census tabulation of urban growth.
Since aggregate data are the basis for this analysis, it suffers from
the inherent weaknesses of such efforts: there is a danger that the
"ecological fallacy" may occur in that inferences concerning individual
voting behavior are speculative at best. 15 Further, the wide range in
the size of Georgia counties (607,542 in Fulton county and 1,924 in
Echols in 1970) creates uneven units of analysis. The former pitfall
will be minimized by limiting inferences to aggregate units and by
pointing out the limitations of the data where appropriate. The latter
problem will be attacked by employing first-order partial correlations
to control bivariate relationships for population size ( Table 1), and
1 3 Counties within SMSA's were Bibb, Chatham, Chattahooche, Clayton, Cobb,
Fulton, Dougherty, DeKalb, Gwinnett, Muscogee, Richmond, and Walker. The
urbanizing counties include Barrow, Bartow, Cherokee, Coweta, Douglas, Fayette,
Forsyth, Henry, Paulding, Peach, Rockdale and Walton. Clarke, Floyd, and Lowndes
are counties containing a town of 25,000-50,000. Glynn, Hall, Houston , Spalding,
Sumter, Whitfield, Ware, and Troup are counties with towns of 15,000-25,000. The
remaining 124 counties are considered "rural."
These breakdowns reflect a rough division of a "cosmopolitan" dimension in
tenns of proximity to an urban center of some kind. Considerable urban-rural
variety and cleavage undoubtedly does exist within some counties. However, the
relatively small size of Georgia counties ( the only state in the union with more
counties is Texas, a much larger state) does not tend to limit such within-unit variane
14 See, for example, M. Margaret Conway, "The White Backlash Re-examined:
Wallace and the 1964 Primaries," Social Science Quarterly, 49 (December, 1968),
710-719; Michael Bogin, "Wallace and the Middle Class: the White Backlash in
Wisconsin," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 98-108; and Numan V.
Bartley, From Thurmond to WaUace: Political Tendencies in Georgia (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
15 For discussions of these problems, see W. Phillips Shively, "Ecological Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," American Political
Science Review, 67 (December, 1969) , 1183-96; Douglas D. Rose, "National and
Local Forces in State Politics," American Political Science Review, 67 ( December,
1973), 1162-64; Eric A. Hanushek, et al., "Model Specification, Use of Aggregate
Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy," Political Methodology , l (Winter,
1974), 90, 97-98.
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by examining subgroup means and standard deviations for certain
characteristics .16
An observer first coming upon the political scene in Georgia may be
surprised that Republicans have not been more successful at the state
level. Republicans have carried the state in the Presidential elections of
1964 and 1972, and have elected Republican members to Congress from
three of Georgia's congressional districts since 1964. Although the Republicans have not won a statewide race, "Bo" Callaway did win a
plurality of the vote in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign. Charles B.
Pyles has noted that "the factors of population change, mbanization,
increased incomes, and higher educational attainment appear to be
favorable to the long-term growth of the GOP." 17 In addition, many
observers believe that the Republicans are better organized politically
than the Democrats. How, then, does one account for the statewide
electoral contest in 1974 in which Ronnie Thompson suffered a 70% to
30% defeat?
An analysis of Thompson's vote relative to earlier votes may aid in
determining whether the 1974 election marks the end of Republican
resurgence in Georgia or whether it was merely a temporary aberration
in the trend toward a competitive two-party system in Georgia. An
examination of typologies of Republican voters developed by other
theorists may cast some light about the shifting Republican constituencies.
In Southern Politics V. 0. Key, Jr. identified four different kinds
of Republicans: presidential, mountain, Negro, and party professional
Republicans. The latter group referred to individuals who were attracted
to state politics primarily by patronage opporhmities. 18 The Republican
vote has, of course, changed considerably in composition in the quarter
of a cenhu·y since Key's work was published, as more recent analysis
suggests. Donald Strong has noted the existence of two major types of
Southern Republicans in recent elections: business, professional, and
16 Hanushek, et al., p. 90, argue that since political scientists are interested in
"the regularities in human behavior associated with the effects of various characteristics, rather than individual behavior per se, aggregate data, analyzed with a properly
specIBed model and sufficient numbers of relevant variables, may be more usefu l
in inferring individual behavior than political scientists have realiezd. All relevant
variables cannot be included, but we believe that a sufficient number have been
included in this analysis. On this issue, see also, W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," American Sociological Review, 15 (June,
1950 ), 351-57, and Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data
in the Study of Electoral Systems," Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed.
Austin Ranney ( Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 99-110.
17 Charles B. Pyles, "Georgia,"
in George E. Dyer and Richard W. Griffin
(eds.), The New Southern Politics ( Chandler-In text, forthcoming), p. 15.
1 s V. 0. Key, Jr., op. cit., pp. 277-297.
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white collar citizens residing in urban areas who are motivated by
economic issues, and white voters in the black-belt counties who are
motivated by racial concems. 19 James Sundquist, in tum, rather than
presenting a static typology, has focused upon three processes through
which "presidential" Republicans- those who cast a Republican vote
only for presidential candidates-are
converted to Republican voters
in sub-presidential contests. Sundquist's processes include: the conversion of leading Democrats into Republicans, bringing along their
personal constituencies; liberal Democrats defecting to the Republicans
to defeat a conservative Democratic nominee; and conservative Democrats defecting to defeat a liberal Democratic nominee. 20 All three of
these processes have been in evidence in Georgia in recent elections.
Phil Campbell and Jimmy Bentley are well-known examples of Democratic converts to Republicanism. Many liberal or at least moderate
Democrats refused to endorse the Maddox Candidacy in 1966 and voted
for "Bo" Callaway. 21 The election of Ben Blackburn to the U. S. House
of Representatives is an apparent instance of conservative Democrats
bolting their party in opposition to the moderately liberal Democratic
nominee, James MacKay. While Republican, rather than Democratic
defections are at issue here, Sundquist's processes may of course be
readily converted to the alternate directions he hypothesized. 22
With these typologies and conversion processes in mind, we will
now tum to the electoral and demographic data which may clarify
which conceptual framework most adequately describes the 1974 electoral picture. Table 1 contains the simple and multiple correlations of
the Republican gubemato1ial vote in 1966, 1970 and 1974 with the 11
independent variables described above.
Table 1 indicates that while there are some continuities in the
relationships between Thompson's correlations with Callaway and Suit
( most notably in regards to SMSA and income), the general picture is
one of discontinuity. Callaway and Suit received more electoral support
than Thompson did in counties which: had larger populations, were
densely settled, were urban, reflected high education levels, and contained high percentages of individuals employed in white collar occupa19 Donald S. Strong, "Further
Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of
Politics, 33 ( May, 1971), 239-256.
20 James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, (Washington,
D. C.:
Brookings Institution , ( 1973 ), pp. 269-274.
2 1 Admittedly, many liberal Democrats were involved in the Ellis Arnall Write-In
Georgia (WIG) campaign. See Bruce Galphin, The Riddle of Lester Maddox: An
Unauthorized Biography ( Atlanta: Camelot, 1968), pp. 105-167.
22 On Blackburn's campaign in 1966, see David L. Paletz, ''The Neglected Context of Congressional Campaigns," Polity, 4 ( Winter, 1971) , 195-217.
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TABLE I. Simple and Multiple Correlations between Republican
Nominees and Several Demographic Variables (County Level Data)
Callaway
Suit

1966
Population Size ....

....

.. .

1970

.517 000

Gubernatorial

Thompson
1974
.037

.571° 00

.085

__ .475000

-.331 000

.090

SMSA

.319° 00

.534° 00

.268° 00

Education

.458000

.464° 00

.072

Income

.295 000
.580° 00

Density
.........

% Rural

% White

Collar

% Manufacturing

.....................

- .233

00

.674'"'

0

.401° 00

.584""

0

.056

.103

.201 00

.501° 00

.368 000

Growth

.100

% Non-White

.175°

Millag e

.358° 00

.587° 00

.191 °0

Multiple Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coefficient of Determination . . . . . . . . . . .

.715
.511

.763
.582

.583
.340

0
00

000

-.444°

= Bivariate
= Bivariate

=

-.210000

Correlation p
Correlation p
Bivariate Correlation p

< .05
< .01

< .001

Underlined bivariate correlations remained significant at least at the .05 level when
controlled for population size with first-order partial correlations.

tions. The correlations for Callaway and Suit are strongly suggestive
of Donald Strong's first type of Republican, the business-professionalwhite collar urbanite. One conclusion which may thus be readily drawn
is that Thompson failed to appeal to a constituency established by the
two previous Republican gubernatorial nominees. Since Thompson can
safely be considered as a conservative candidate, it may be supposed
that this segment of his potential constituency is relatively moderate and
was alienated by Thompson's style and campaign appeals.
The vote of Strong's second type of Republican, the black belt
white, is more difficult to assess. In previous decades the vast majority
of Georgia's black belt vote could safely be assumed to be almost totally
white. Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, increasing numbers
of blacks have registered and voted. The aggregate data analyzed here
thus limit the type of inferences which may be drawn. As recently as
1970, however , Lester Maddox's vote was positively correlated with the
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percentage nonwhite in a oounty, 23 although Maddox lost the black belt
in the 1974 gubernatorial primary. There is some basis to believe, then,
that whites in black belt counties may be activated when racial issues
are salient. In any event, Callaway seems to have received ,a slightly
higher share of the vote in black belt counties ( against Lester Maddox)
in 1966, while both Suit and Thompson's votes were negatively correlated with the percent of nonwhite population.
Thompson thus achieved the unique distinction of losing support
from both of the major types of Republican voters outlined by Strong.
For a number of reasons, Thompson might not have been expected to
appeal to affluent, well educated, urban Republicans. However, it is
also evident that Thompson failed to activate the white voters who
might have been expected to be most responsive to the race issue. In
this respect, Thompson's campaign and failure parallel that of Lester
Maddox in the 1974 gubernatorial primary: Maddox lost the black belt
counties to George Bu~bee. Maddox and Thompson both seemed to
project an image for which there was no longer much of a constituency.
Table 1 may also be interpreted as the reverse of one of Sundquist's
conversion processes. To the degree that "liberalism" may be inferred
from high levels of education, white collar occupations, and urbanization, it appears as though many "liberal," or perhaps urban Republicans
defected from their party to help defeat an unpalatable candidate. There
are many possible reasons for this. Thompson was a "maverick" candidate, who ran in both the Republican and Democratic primaries. He
defeated a number of regular Republicans in the first party primary
and won the nomination by narrowly defeating the more moderate
and "respectable" Harold Dye in the runoff. Thompson spent the campaign quarreling with the Republican state party chairman, Bob Shaw .
In addition, Thompson's demagogic style was not designed to attract
more thoughtful, issue-oriented urban voters. Still, a process of urban
defection in the Republican party is a relatively recent phenomenon in
the South, because Republicans previously had few votes they could
lose. The fact that such a reversal is possible may be an indicator of
growing two-party competition in the South. It remains to be seen,
however, whether this Republican vote defection is permnaent or temporary.
28 See Michael W. McKinney and Robert K. Whelan, "Urbanism, Localism, and
the Race Factor in Southern Political Patterns," Paper delivered at the 1974 Annual
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 7-9, p. 8.
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Both V. 0. Key and Sundquist refer to "'presidential" Republicans.
One way of assessing the degree of vote transference from the presidential to the state level is to correlate the county-by-county vote for
recent presidential elections with the gubernatorial contests being examined here. Since Georgia's gubernatorial elections are held in the
middle of the presidential term , several interv ening factors are capable
of biasing the analysis: changes in county demographic characteristics,
national or international events, and changes in the nature of campaigns
and opponents. In addition, the concepts of "conversion" or vote "transference" are dynamic ones, while correlations are static representation
of the distribution of votes. The correlations in Table 2 thus can only
be considered as rough indicators of the congmence between pairs of
elections.
Table 2 offers a mixed picture in regard to Sundquist's hypotheses
concerning the conversion of "presidential Republicans" to state and local
Republican voters. There are some substantial correlations between votes
that might be interpreted as supporting the notion of conversion. In
TABLE 2.

Correlations between Republican Gubernatorial and Presidential Votes,
1960-1972
Nixon
Nixon
Goldwater
Nixon

1960
Callaway 1966 .......
.. .... . . .4soooo
Suit 1970 .......
..........
. .501° 00
Thompson 1974 ..........
. .. . .068
0
=p < .05
00
=p < .01
000
= p < .001

1964
.167°
-.208° 0
.016

1968

1972

.501 °00
,847000

-.332° 00
-.022
.208° 0

.289000

particular, Suit's correlation with the Nixon vote in 1968 is substantial,
as is "Bo" Callaway's. The general pattern, however, is far from clear
It might be expected that any transference from national to local candidates would occur immediately after an election in which the national
figure obtains a large preponderance of the vote. If a transference is
to occur, a necessary condition would seem to be that a substantial
number of Democrats had been induced to vote for the presidential
candidacy of a Republican. In 1972 Richard Nixon carried more than
70% of the popular vote in Georgia. Two years later Republican Ronnie
Thompson could garner only 31% of the vote in his quest for governor.
The correlation ( .208) between Thompson's vote and Nixon's 1972
vote is significant, indicating that the county percentage distributions
were related. However, the magnitude of the Thompson vote does not
approach that of ixon's. The data used here do not lend themselves
directly to the type of dynamic analysis suggested by Sundquist. How-
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ever, if vote transference were taking place, more consistent correlations
between national and state level candidates should manifest themselves.
The data examined above may be used to argue that any type of
vote transference among national and Georgia state Republican candidates is very limited, and indeed, this may represent the weakness of
Republicanism in Georgia. That is, the limited continuity among all
state and national level Republican votes suggests that candidate attractiveness powerfully reinforces ( or fails to reinforce) Republican identification, perhaps to the point that the nature of a candidate's appeal
( and of course his opposition's) is a more important determinant than
party label. This does not imply that any "hard core" Republican
continuity exists. The correlations among the three Republican gubernatorial votes studied here suggest that a temporal continuity does exist,
but that it does not extend beyond one election. The Callaway-Suit
correlation is .466, Suit-Thompson is .458, but Thompson-Callaway is
-.144. The first two product-moment correlations are significant at the
.001 level, the last one at the .05 level. It could, of course, be argued
that Ronnie Thompson was a very different type of candidate in relation to Suit and Callaway. This is undobutedly true, yet the point is
that for whatever reason, a consistent Republican vote, at least at the
gubernatorial level in Georgia, has not emerged. Thus while Democrats
in Georgia may be able to take a certain "residual" loyalty for granted,
Republicans have yet to develop such an electoral foundation.
One other way in which the shifting nature of Republican electoral
bases may be depicted is by means of an analysis of the geo-demographic distributions of the three recent gubernatorial elections. Table
3 contains the unweighted means of the Callaway, Suit, and Thompson
percentages of the county votes, grouped by categories of the SMSA
variable. Several analysts of the southern political arena have noted
that urban, town, and rural areas differ widely in respect to the
support they grant to candidates for political office.24 Examining the
breakdowns in Table 3 to determine whether significant differences
exist between urban, town, and rural voting patterns allows some
assessment of the nature of the Republican vote. 25
In wide perspective, Table 3 shows that the Republican vote in
Georgia has been an urban one, although the Suit, and in particular
the Thompson election, suggest that this is decreasingly the case. The
24
See Bartley, op. cit.; Joseph L. Bernd, "Georgia: Static and Dynamic," in
William C. Havard (ed.), The Changing Politics of the South ( Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 304-311; and V. 0. Key, op. cit .
. 25 The Difference of Means test used is described in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr.,
Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, first edition, 1960), pp. 170-176.
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Republican vote has in the past been centered in the counties within
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. These areas, which presented
Callaway with 56% of their votes in 1966, cast 42% for Suit in 1970,
and only 31% for Thompson in 1974. Moreover, Thompson's vote differs
from the others in that only in the 12 urbanizing counties is his percentage of the vote significantly higher than in the rural counties.
Callaway and Suit consistently generated significantly more electoral
support in the SMSA and town counties than in the rural counties.
TABLE 3.

Unweighted Means and Standard Deviations of Republican Gubernatorial Votes by SMSA Categories, 1966-1974
Callaway 1966
Suit 1970
Thompson 1974
Total Counties (N = 159)
Mean= .384
.274
.295
SD = .128
.114
.902
SMSA Counties (N = 12)
Mean = .561 000
.416° 0 0
.311
SD = .141
.142
.102
Urbanizing Counties (N = 12)
.368000
Mean =.322
.413° 00
.062
SD =.099
.062
Large Town Counties (N = 3)
.240
Mean= .566 600
.45200
SD =.056
.059
.071
Small Town Counties (N = 8)
Mean= .524° 00
.268
.332°
SD = .078
.086
.059
Rural Counties (N = 124)
Mean = .358
.239
.283
SD = .108
.087
.083
000 = signiflcantly different from Rural Counties mean at .001 level
00
= significantly different from Rural Counties mean at .01 level
0
= significantly different from Rural Counties mean at .05 level

These findings further suggest that the Republican hold on an urban
and town electoral base is tentative at best.
Other possible sources of Republican electoral support exist in the
"mountain" counties, as suggested by V. 0. Key.2 6 The electoral percentages for Republican presidential and gubernatorial candidates in
four of the north Georgia counties which have consistently provided
support for Republicans is presented in Table 4. In 1972, these four
counties each cast in excess of 75% of their ballots for the presidential
candidacy of Richard Nixon. Their levels of support for Callaway and
Suit were higher than other rural counties. In 1974, however, Fannin
and Gilmer counties' percentages for Thompson were only slightly above
26 E. Merton Coulter provides an historical perspective on Georgia's mountain
counties in his Georgia: A Short History ( Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, Third Revised Edition, 1960), p. 458.
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Republican Percentages of the Vote in Four "Mountain" Counties in

Georgia, 1960-1974
Nixon

.... ' ... . . ...
Gilmer .. . ... .. .. .. ..
Towns ... . .. ........
Union . ... ... .. ... . ..
Fannin

1960
66%
56
55
56

Goldwater

1964
54%
50

47
41

Calla-

Nixon

Nixon

way

Suit

1968
59%
52
52
39

1972
80%
78

1966
63%
49
51
38

1970
63%
50
48
38

80

76

Thompson

1974
42%
35
29
29

the statewide mean , while Towns and Union were below. Here again,
as with urban and black belt Republicans, candidate attractiveness did
not reinforce or activate latent Republican tendencies. Transference of
Republican electoral strength from the presidential election in 1972 to
Thompson's 1974 governor's race also appears to be absent.
None of the typologies discussed above offer a totally satisfactory
explanation of the sources of contemporary Republican electoral support in Georgia. This is the case largely because Republican success
at the ballot box depends so little upon party identification and so
much upon the appeal of a candidate to independent and Democratic
voters. Typical of this state of affairs is the difference between the
numbers of Republican votes in the primary runoff as compared to
the general election in 1974. The gubernatorial nominees in the Republican primary runoff election, Harold Dye and Ronnie Thompson,
received a combined total of 43,880 votes. Thompson, in turn, received
289,013 votes while losing to George Busbee in the general election.
This figure represents more than 13 times the number of votes Thompson
received in the Republican primary runoff ( although he received more
votes in the Democratic primary). If voting in a party primary is any
indication at all of party identification levels ( and primary election
crossovers undoubtedly exist in Georgia, although the degree of such
crossover voting has yet to be established), a candidate might expect
to make little political capital by appealing to Republican party loyalty.
Indeed, the only rational strategy for a Republican candidate in Georgia
would seem to be to appeal to the largest possible number of elements
that make up the potential Republican vote: white collar urbanites,
mountain Republicans, black belt whites, and suburban voters.

